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Credit guarantees have become increasingly more important  for the export of
agricultural  commodities.  All major exporting countries of agricultural  commodities have
some form of credit guarantee  program.  Financing  terms vary by  country, with some
providing more flexibility than U.S. programs.  As the importance of these credit programs
escalates, it will be incumbent on exporting countries to carefully examine the value of their
features relative to competitor's  programs.  This study developed a model using option
pricing theory to estimate the  "fair  market value" of credit guarantees.  The model was
applied to U.S.  GSM-102 credit guarantees.  The model was used to make comparisons of the
value of U.S. program  features to those of competing countries' programs.  The value of
adding more flexibility to program  provisions was evaluated.  Specific provisions examined
included adding coverage for freight and insurance, an exchange rate guarantee, changing
down payment requirements,  principal and interest coverage, and the term of the guarantee.
The value of export credit guarantees  extended to a base country were estimated at
$21.58 per MT or 13.76 percent of the value of exports.  Adding guarantees  for freight and
insurance and exchange rates increased  the value of GSM guarantees  by  $3.50 and $0.20 per
MT,  respectively.  The value of credit guarantees  was most sensitive to the price level and
volatility of price changes for the importer's letter of credit.  Decreasing  premium coverage
or increasing  down payments reduced the value of credit guarantees on approximately an
equal percentage basis.
Including an exchange rate guarantee as a component of GSM credit guarantees
resulted in the value of guarantees  becoming sensitive to the current value, strike price, and
volatility of exchange rates.  Further, adding an exchange rate option produced interesting
results for changes in interest rates for GSM guarantees and alternative interest rates in the
importing country.  Changing the GSM interest rates impacted the value of the base
guarantee, while changes in the interest rate spread between the GSM rate and the importers
alternative cost of borrowing affects the value of an exchange rate guarantee. A one percent
decline in the GSM rate decreased the value of the base guarantee by  $2.11/MT.  Decreasing
the interest rate spread between the GSM rate and the importers alternative rate increased  the
value of an exchange rate guarantee up to the point where the interest spread becomes
negative.  As the spread becomes increasingly negative, the value of the exchange rate
guarantee declines.
Decreasing  the guarantees' term for both the current  program, a program that
covered  freight and insurance, and a program with an exchange rate guarantee reduced the
value of the guarantee. However, the value of the exchange rate guarantee declined as the
term of the guarantee increased.
VPercentage changes in principal, interest coverage, term, and down payment for the
GSM program resulted in equal or smaller changes in the value of guarantees.  However,
these values are evaluated  from the perspective of the CCC.  Valuation of changes in these
parameters  when viewed by participating  banks and importers may affect the success/failure
of the implementation of any of these changes.
Finally, the value of credit guarantee  programs  for Canada, Australia, France, and
the U.S. were compared  for a base country.  The Canadian  guarantee had the lowest value
($18.36/MT), followed by the U.S.  ($21.58/MT), Australia ($23.23), and French guarantees
($26.32/MT).  The main reasons  for the French guarantees  having the greatest value was the
inclusion of coverage for freight and insurance and higher interest coverage.
viValuing  Option Provisions
for Export Credit Guarantees
Bruce L.  Dahl, William W.  Wilson,  and Cole  R.  Gustafson*
INTRODUCTION
Credit guarantee  programs have become increasingly  more important for the export  of
agricultural products.  In  1993,  the U.S.  exported $3.828  million of agricultural  products
under GSM-102  and GSM-103,  the Commodity  Credit Corporation's  (CCC's) export  credit
guarantee programs  (USDA-FAS).  All major exporters  of agricultural  products including
Canada,  EU,  and Australia  have export credit guarantee programs.  Under the recent  GATT
agreement,  exporting countries  must limit export programs that provide visible
price/commodity  subsidies like the Export Enhancement Program  (EEP) and the EU
restitution.  Use of export credit guarantee programs could  escalate due to limitations  on
programs like  EEP and increase  in popularity  as a means of promoting  agricultural exports. 1
Competition among exporting  countries'  programs will make it more important to
evaluate the critical  features  that enhance their value.  Under the  U.S.  GSM-102 export
credit program the U.S.  acts like a Stackelberg  leader.  Traditionally,  the CCC announces
allocations  annually,  and terms are standardized  across  importing countries.  This  implies
limited flexibility when granting  loans and limits the ability to differentiate  guarantee
premiums  by loan risk.  In contrast,  the French COFACE program provides  a high degree of
flexibility  in specifying  terms across  importing countries,  and Canadian programs charge
export credit insurance  premiums  for coverage  based on risk characteristics  of the loan
(Harris).
In this study,  we develop  a methodology to derive the implied  value of provisions
embedded  in export credit guarantee programs.  The model was applied to various export
credit guarantee terms/provisions  to examine  the value of providing increased  flexibility and
comparisons were made with competing  countries'  programs.
*Research associate,  professor,  and professor and interim chair,  respectively,  in the
Department of Agricultural  Economics,  North Dakota  State University,  Fargo.
1For a more in-depth discussion of Export Credit Guarantee programs,  utilization,  and
issues see Dahl et al.REVIEW OF U.S.  AND  COMPETITOR PROGRAM PROVISIONS
Most major  exporting countries of agricultural commodities  extend some form of
export credit guarantees/insurance.  The U.S.,  Canada,  Australia,  France and other countries
in the EU have export credit  insurance/guarantee  programs.  The U.S.  has  several  export
credit programs  operated by CCC; however,  most guarantees  are extended under the  GSM-
102  and GSM-103  programs.  These programs  guarantee  export sales to importers  financed
through U.S.  banks.  If importers default  on export loans,  the CCC  reimburses the U.S.
bank and takes  ownership of the  loan.  These programs  cover 98 percent of the principal  and
2.8 percent interest for terms up to 3 years (GSM-102)  and 3 to  10 years  (GSM-103). 2
Credit allocations  under these programs  are announced  each year by country  and commodity.
Premiums  are charged based on the term of the loan;  however,  all countries  are charged the
same rate regardless of the risk involved.  No exchange  rate  guarantee  is provided,  and
freight and insurance  can only be included  as  a response to  a competing  offer.  This means
that the  U.S.  announces  how many dollars  in GSM guarantees  it will  extend to individual
importers  for particular commodities.  Traditionally,  terms of the credit  agreement have  been
standardized  across importers.
Provisions for credit insurance/guarantee  programs  of competing exporting  countries
vary  (Table  1).  Most countries  offer terms of 1 to 3 years with some offering  shorter and/or
longer terms.  For example,  France  and the U.S.  can extend  guarantees for up to  10  years,
while  some exporters of agricultural  commodities  like Malaysia  and Ireland will only extend
up to  180 days.  Coverage  limits also  vary.  Most countries offer  coverage on 85  to  100
percent of the principal and from all to only  a portion of the interest paid.  In 1993-94,  U.S.
GSM-102  guarantees  covered 2.8 percent  interest except for the Former Soviet  Union where
all interest  was covered.  Most credit guarantee  programs have  not required  a down payment;
however,  Canada requires a down payment of 10  to 25 percent.
Premium rates charged  vary both across countries  and within programs.  The U.S.
charges  a flat fee to all  importing  countries.  Other exporters,  notably  Canada,  Australia,
Belgium,  Ireland,  Netherlands,  and Portugal,  vary their premiums based on the  credit
worthiness.of the  importing  country.
Guarantees  that include freight terms  (c & f, c.i.f) are offered  by a number of
countries  to match other offers.  France  includes these terms when shipped  on French
vessels.  Canada may offer  c & f sales;  however,  inclusion of c & f terms reduces  the
amount of grain that can be purchased under credit limits.
2Guarantees  to the FSU were  changed in  1991  to cover  100 percent of the principal  and
interest at the  prevailing rate for 52-week Treasury  Bills.
2Table  1.  Terms and  Conditions of Export Credit Programs  of Major Exporters.
Entity Extending  Maximum Credit  Exchange  Risk
Country  Credit  Terms  Coverage  Down payment  Premium  Freight Guarantee  Interest Subsidies  Guarantee
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Source: HarrisInterest  subsides  and exchange  rate guarantees  are not available  from most exporters.
Canada has  the ability  to use interest  subsidies,  but has  not used them for many  years.
France offers interest  subsidies through  Banque  Francaise  du Commerce Exterieur  (BFCE)
and exchange  rate guarantees.  The U.S.  does not extend either interest subsidies  or
exchange  rate guarantees  through GSM-102,  GSM-103,  or Eximbank.3
PREVIOUS  STUDIES  ON VALUATION  OF GUARANTEES
Valuation of guarantees  has  received more attention in the past few years  due in part
to advances  in option valuation models.  Contingent  claims analysis using option pricing
theory provides  a useful analytical  model to value guarantees.  Previous  research using
option pricing  to value guarantees  has focused on several specific  areas.  Most of the work
done initially  on guarantee  valuation was  applied to FDIC insurance  guarantees  (Merton) and
federal  guarantees  (Jones  and  Sosin) for large  corporate  loans (Chrysler,  Massey Ferguson,
the steel  industry).  Another  related area  has focused on valuation of FmHA and state
guarantees  of farm loans (Sherrick).
The following  sections review literature  on alternative  valuations of GSM  guarantees
and exchange rate guarantee  programs.  Then,  pertinent literature  on option pricing and
guarantees  is reviewed.  Literature  related to valuing exchange  rate options  is also examined.
Export Credit Guarantee Valuation
Previous  research  on the valuation of export credit guarantees  has focused on two
areas.  First,  Skully and Hyberg  et al.  examined the subsidy value  of GSM  guarantees  by
estimating the  inherent interest  subsidy contained in GSM guarantees.  The value of the
guarantee  was represented  by the interest rate differential facing  the importer when
borrowing  with the guarantee  versus  higher alternative costs  for borrowing.  Hyberg  et al.
estimated the implied  interest  subsidy incorporated  in GSM guarantees  averaged 4.39 percent
of the value of GSM  allocations  for wheat exports from  1979-1992.  This indicates  the
potential  magnitude of implicit interest  subsidies extended  to countries for given
commodities.
3Credit programs  of individual  countries  are continuing  to be modified.  Canada,  which
previously  focused on sovereign  sales,  in 1995  changed provisions  and  set aside  $1 billion
for loans to non-sovereign  buyers.  Further,  the U.S.  announced  an adjustable interest rate
for the  1995  GSM-102  and  GSM-103  programs.  Both fix interest rates  for a period  of one
year based on the  52 week rate for Treasury  bills and is adjusted  annually.  Rates  for GSM-
102  and GSM-103  are not to exceed  55 percent and 80 percent respectively,  of the most
recent  52-week  Treasury bill auction prior to the date  rates are adjusted.
4The  second area has  focused on the addition  of an exchange  rate guarantee  to GSM
programs  to determine  if it was cost effective  (Baxter  and Smith).  They used cost benefit
analysis and indicated that the program  could be cost effective  if it produced additional  credit
exports  without displacing  other U.S.  exports that are greater in value  than the cost of
operating the program.  They  indicated that the level of additional  exports  required to cover
cost of program operation  is unlikely to be obtained.  In addition,  countries with the potential
for additional credit exports  show the greatest potential  for displacing  other U.S.  commercial
exports.  Thus,  they argued that an exchange  rate program may  not be cost effective.
Valuation  of FDIC Insurance Guarantees and Related  Studies
Several  studies have examined the valuation of credit guarantees for non-export  loans
using option pricing models.  Seminal work in this area  focused on deposit insurance  and
includes work by Merton on deposit insurance  and loan guarantees.  Merton presented  the
basic premise  of valuing loan guarantees  as a put option written by the government  on the
value of bank assets.  The limited liability inherent  in a federal deposit guarantee  is
equivalent  to the limited liability  inherent in a common stock put option.  Merton then
demonstrated  that valuing  federal deposit  guarantees  was equivalent to valuing common stock
put options using the  options pricing model developed by Black,  and Black and Sholes.  He
argued that the value of deposit insurance  guarantees  can be calculated  as a traditional put
option model developed by Black and Sholes.
Jones and  Sosin extended Merton's  analysis  to examine  valuing federal  guarantees  for
deposit insurance  and loans  by  large corporations.  Their analysis incorporated  valuations
that considered  guaranteed  and unguaranteed junior and senior debt.  Jones  also examined
effects of partial  versus full guarantees.
Flood reviewed  studies  on valuing  federal deposit  insurance  guarantees using  option
pricing methods.  He presented a methodology to value  different levels of federal  deposit
insurance  coverage  and deductibles using compound  or multiple options.  Maximum  coverage
levels  were valued using two options:  one written by the FDIC on the  assets of the bank and
the other written by the depositor and held by the FDIC.  This is similar to valuation  of
senior  and junior debt,  but includes different owners  of the  options.
Other recent  studies  examined  federal deposit insurance  guarantees focusing  on costs
associated with introducing  flexibility  into the program terms (Ronn and Verma,  Pennacchi).
Pennacchi  examined changes from  a flat insurance  premium to one based on risk.  Ronn and
Verma used  an option model to value federal  deposit insurance  and applied  it to a cross
section of banks.  They  indicated their model was more appropriate for ranking banks than
for estimating  a value for individual  banks.  Alternatively,  it could be used as a decision aid
for allocating  a given premium over the market.
5Flood also discussed  problems associated  with insurance  guarantee  valuations with
option models.  An important problem  is how  to estimate  the volatility  of a bank's  assets.
Since values  for a bank's assets  are not readily observable,  estimates  of volatility  can be
difficult to acquire.  An alternative  formulation for valuing  guarantees  that is more general
was developed  by Sherrick in his  examination of FmHA  and Indiana Farmer loan guarantee
programs.  Sherrick presented a model that introduced a more general  3 parameter Burr-12
(Singh-Maddala)  distribution.  This distribution contains  the traditional log-normal  assumed
by Black-Sholes  as a special case.  Sherrick indicated this distribution family  is used
extensively  in the  insurance  industry to model loss distributions under liability policies  and
has been used to fit business  failure data.  Sherrick  advanced  the following  theoretical
valuation for loan guarantees  based on the Burr-12 distribution:
Guarantee  =  e-r()  {p(VT)}  aX"yVTrl-(VT  +X)-(0+l)  dVT
where
Guarantee  is the  "fair market value"  of the guarantee,
V  is asset value,
{p(V,)}  is the loan guarantee  payoff as a function of asset value,
aX•yV,VT~Y(VN  +X)-(a+l)  is the  PDF for the Burr-12 distribution,
r is the  risk adjusted discount rate
T is the  time to maturity,
a  is the  scale parameter  for the  Burr-12 distribution,  and
X and 7 are shape  parameters for the Burr-12 distribution.
However,  data are  required to estimate the  Burr-12 distribution parameters  to establish  the
probability of future default.
Exchange  Rate Guarantee Valuation
Exchange rates  have  significant impacts  on the levels  of agricultural  trade.  Pick
indicated that the effects  of exchange  rate variability  were significant for a few  developing
countries,  but not for the  developed countries.  He  suggested  that this may  occur because
developed  countries have  access to more developed financial  and commodity markets with
which they can defray  or hedge  costs of exchange  rate variability.
Options on foreign currency  exchange  can be used to guarantee  an exchange rate
level.  The  value of a foreign exchange  rate  guarantee  is equivalent  to the value of a put
option on foreign currency exchange.  Organized  exchanges  exist around the  world for
trading  options on many  of the currencies  for developed  countries.  In addition, valuation  of
options  on foreign  exchange  has been examined  extensively  (Garman and Kohlhagen,  Orlin,
Grabbe,  and  Shastri and Tandon).
6Prior research on formulation of option valuation models  for foreign currency
exchange  identified differences  based on whether  options are on spot or futures exchange
rates.  Garman and Kohlhagen and Grabbe  argued that using the  Black-Sholes model to value
options  on foreign currency  exchange  was incorrect.  Models  on foreign currency  exchange
must include  expectations  about  interest rates in both countries.  Since expectations  about
interest  rates  in both countries  are incorporated  into the price of the futures contract,
formulation of an option valuation model based on futures  results in a model similar  to the
Black-Sholes  model.  However,  they argued  that valuation of options  for foreign exchange
based on spot prices did not incorporate  expectations  on interest rates,  thus,  their valuation
required information on both interest rates.  A general model for valuation of call options  on
foreign currency  exchange  based  on spot exchange  rates  is as follows (Ritchken):
C(X)  =  Soe(-rT)N(d1) - Xe(-rT)N(d2)
where
C(X)  is the value of the exchange  rate option,
X  is the strike  price,
So is the  spot rate,
a is the  instantaneous volatility of the spot rate,
r is the  risk free interest  rate for currency  1,
r* is the  risk free interest  rate for currency  2,
N (.) is the cumulative  normal density function,
di  =  {ln(So/X)  +  (r - r*  +  o2 /2)T}  / oVT,  and
d2  = di -oT.
This formula  assumes  a lognormal distribution of foreign exchange  rates.  Ritchken indicated
that empirical  studies have  indicated  large deviations  from this distribution are possible.
ANALYTICAL  MODEL TO VALUE  EXPORT CREDIT PROGRAMS
A model was developed to estimate  the value  of GSM export credit  guarantees
extended to importers,  to value  the effects  of flexibility  and to make  comparisons across
exporting  countries'  programs.  Following Merton,  valuation of government  guarantees  for
bank deposits  or corporate  liabilities is equivalent  to the limited liability  of a common stock
put option.  Traditionally,  credit guarantees  have the same  limited liability.
These  can be illustrated inFigure  1.  At maturity,  if the  value of the credit being
guaranteed  is low,  the guarantee  has  a positive value to the holder of the guarantee.  As the
value of the credit being guaranteed increases,  the value of the guarantee  to the holder
decreases.  Losses  incurred from the purchase  of the guarantee  by the holder are  limited to
the premium paid for the guarantee.  Similarly,  as the value  of the credit being guaranteed
increases,  the value of the guarantee  to the writer  (e.g.  CCC) increases.  When the value  of
the  credit being guaranteed  exceeds  the amount guaranteed,  the value  to the  writer of the











Value of Underlying Asset at Expiration
Figure  1.  Value  of Put Option to Writer (CCC) and Holder  (Exporting  Bank),  at Expiration
of Option
8The Black-Sholes  option model was assumed for estimating  the value of a credit
guarantee  obtained with the GSM-102  program.  This model provides  an estimate  of a  "fair
market  value"  of the guarantee  if it were traded on an organized exchange  and is comparable
to the  "actuarially  fair" premium an insured (importer/U.S.  bank) would pay for this
insurance/guarantee.  Credit  guarantees  are valued  as:
G(T)  = Be'r4(x2) - V4(xi)
where
G is the  fair market value of the loan guarantee,
T is the term of the loan guarantee,
B is the strike or guarantee price,
V is the  current value  of the asset,
4 (.) is the cumulative  normal density function,
xi  =  {log(B/V)-(r+  o2/2)T}  / oT, and
x2  = x1  + oaT,
Greater flexibility  in the terms of the credit guarantee  involves  changing coverage
levels,  adding  additional coverage  for freight  and insurance,  and adding  an exchange  rate
guarantee.  Flood examined  the valuation of different coverage  levels  for federal deposit
insurance.  He indicated that different coverage  levels  can be viewed  as compound  or
multiple options  written on the bank's assets  where deposits are held.  In the case  of credit
guarantees  extended by CCC,  the principal covered could be implicitly  represented by an
option written  by the  CCC and held by the U.S.  bank.  The uncovered  portion does  not
affect the value of the CCC guarantee.  It represents an option written by the stockholders
'and depositors of the exporting  bank on the value of the assets  of the bank (including  the
letter of credit from the importer)  and held by the exporting banks'  stockholders.
In this  analysis,  we  are only concerned with the valuation of the guarantee  extended
by the  CCC; and consequently,  valuing flexibility for the percent of principal covered  can be
modeled by simply  increasing  or decreasing  the value of the asset being guaranteed.
Additional  coverage  for freight and insurance  has the  same impact  from the perspective  of
the CCC  and can be incorporated by adding these costs to the amount guaranteed.  However,
the true value of the  guarantee  can also be examined  from other perspectives  including those
of the  participating  bank and the importer.  These different perspectives  would necessitate
different value formulations  comprised of multiple options.
An exchange rate guarantee  adds further complexity  to the valuation of export credit
guarantees.  This adds the  equivalent of a second  guarantee onto the basic  export credit
guarantee.  A  second option model was assumed for estimating  the fair market value of this
potential  change  in coverage.  A general model for valuation of put options on foreign
currency exchange  based on spot exchange  rates  is as follows (Ritchken):
9P(X)  = Xe(-rT)N(-d2) - Se(-rT)N(-d,)
where
P(X) is the  value of the exchange  rate  guarantee,
X is the  strike price,
So  is the spot rate,
a is the  instantaneous volatility  of the spot rate,
r is the risk free rate for currency  1,
r* is the risk free  rate for currency  2,
N (.) is the cumulative  normal density function,
d,  =  {ln(So/X)  + (r - r*  +  o2 /2)T}  / oVT,  and
d2  = di -oT.
The total  value of credit guarantees  is assumed to be the sum of the  two estimated
option values where  applicable.  This does  not consider the interaction of variables  affecting
each of the option valuations.  However,  it should provide outer bounds  for the  changes
examined.  Further,  interactions of variables  that affect both the guarantee  and exchange rate
portions of the  total value of the credit guarantee  would tend  to reinforce  each other.  Thus,
solutions  should approach the  sum of the two individual option values.
DATA
Data required  for estimation  of the value of export credit  guarantees  were  gathered
from several sources.  FOB and freight and  insurance  values were gathered  for the countries
examined by Landes and Ash.  Exchange  rates and interest rates  (London Interbank Offer
Rates-LIBOR and local lending  rates) were  gathered from the International  Monetary  Fund.
Current forfaiting rates4 were  obtained from issues of International  Trade Finance.
Model  parameters for the base case were taken to be representative  of a typical
importing country using credit,  in particular,  those in the base case  are representative  of
Pakistan.  Simulations  were conducted on critical model parameters to evaluate their
sensitivity.  Data used for the initial parameter  values are  shown in Table 2.  Principal  and
interest coverage,  down payments,  and the term of the guarantee  represent  1994 provisions
for GSM programs  (Table  1).  Interest rates for the GSM program  were assumed to be 25
basis points over the London Interbank Offer Rates (LIBOR)  (Skully,  Hyberg et al.).  The
current  value  for the  market value  of letters of credit by country  was estimated  by applying
the discount indicated  by current forfaiting  rates to a base  ($1,000) letter of credit.  Due to
the unavailability of data on the value  of the importers'  letter of credit,  an initial value of .3
was assumed  for the volatility.  The annualized  volatility of exchange  rates for the base
country was  estimated from monthly observations  of exchange  rates over the  3-year period
1991-1993.
4Forfaiting  is an export trade financing  mechanism that trades properly  executed  and
documented debt obligations obtained  directly from  exporters (can be letters of credit).
Forfaiting rates  are the  discount applied to the future  flow of funds and reflect the forfaiter's
cost of funds  and a premium.
10Table 2.  Initial Parameters for Option Valuation  of GSM Guarantees.
Item  Value  Units
FOB Value  of Exports  156.78  $/MT
Freight and Insurance  26.00  $/MT
GSM  Interest rate  (Libor  +  25)  6.875  %
Risk Free Interest rate - Importer  13.05  %
Percent principal coverage  98.00  %
Percent of interest covered  2.8  % pts.
Down payment  0.0  %
Current value of letter of credit  903.125  $/1000
Volatility  of letter of credit  0.30  Std Dev.
Current value of exchange  rate  24.58  Local cur/Dollar
Volatility  of exchange  rate  0.042  Std Dev.
Term  3  Years
RESULTS
The value of credit guarantees  was estimated  using provisions  in place  for GSM-102
in Fiscal Year  1994.  Credit  guarantees  covered  98 percent of the FOB value of exports  and
2.8 percent  interest for up to 3 years.  No down payment was required,  and premiums
ranged from  .16 to  .67 percent of the  value of exports  depending  on the term of the
guarantee.  Coverage for freight,  insurance,  and exchange  rates  were not included  in the
initial valuation.
Results from the initial  valuation and alternative  types of flexibility  are  shown in
Table 3.  The value of GSM credit  guarantees  extended  to the base country was  13.76
percent of the export  value  ($21.58 per MT).  Adding coverage  for freight  and insurance
increases  the  value of GSM  credit guarantees  by $3.50 per MT.  Adding an exchange  rate
guarantee  to either the base case or the case with freight  and insurance  increases the value  of
credit  guarantees  to $21.78 per MT and $25.31  per MT,  respectively.  These results  suggest
that adding coverage  for freight would have the greatest  impact on the  value of credit
guarantees.  An exchange  guarantee  adds minimal  additional value  to the GSM  guarantee.
11Table 3.  Fair Market Value  of Credit Guarantees,  By Type of Coverage.
Change from Base
Guarantee  Option Value  Actual  Percent
$/MT  $/MT  %
Base Case  $21.58  --  --
Base Case  + Freight  $25.08  $3.50  16.2
Base Case  +  Exchange  $21.78  $0.20  0.9
Base Case  + Freight  +  Exchange  $25.31  $3.73  17.3
Sensitivity Analysis
Initial parameters were varied to examine the sensitivity  of the  value of GSM
guarantees  to changes  in conditions  and program provisions.  Changes  examined  included the
value of the letter of credit guaranteed,  volatility  of the value of letter of credit,  FOB value
of exports,  down payment  level, percent  of principal and interest covered,  length of term of
the  guarantee,  adding  coverage  for freight and insurance,  and adding  an exchange  rate
guarantee.
Changes  in Default Risk
An important parameter  affecting the value  of a credit guarantee  is the  default risk of
the  importer.  In this model,  this  is represented  by the volatility  and price level of the
underlying  asset (value of the  letter of credit).  Importers with greater  default risk would
have  larger volatilities  in the value of the letter of credit and/or  lower price  levels.  The
model  was simulated  to analyze  impacts  of these parameters  on the value of GSM credit
guarantees.
Decreasing  the price level of the underlying asset increases the  value of GSM credit
guarantees  (Figure 2).  As the price  level for the underlying asset decreases,  the value of the
credit guarantee  increases  at an increasing  rate.  Strictly interpreted,  these results illustrate
that the  value of a GSM credit  guarantee would be $21.74 for a country  whose letter of
credit has  a  current value of $900.  For a higher risk country whose  letter of credit would be
$450,  the  value of the GSM guarantee  would be $61.62.
There  is a positive relationship  between the volatility of the  letter of credit and the
value of the GSM  guarantee  (Figure  3).  Increases  in the volatility  of price changes  for the
underlying  asset increases the  value of extending  credit guarantees  but, at a decreasing  rate.
In our base case,  the volatility  was assumed  at .3 and the value of the guarantee  was
$21.58/MT.  For a higher risk country  whose volatility  would be  .6,  the  value of the
guarantee increases  to $47.64/MT.  Thus,  countries with higher default  risk would have a
greater value of the guarantee  implied in the GSM program.  Changes in either the volatility
or price  level of the  letter of credit, within the range examined,  has a dramatic impact on the
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13Figures 2 and 3 also illustrate  that adding coverage  for freight and insurance  to the
base guarantee  increased the sensitivity of the value of the guarantee to  changes in default
risk.  As default risk increased,  the value of the guarantee  including coverage  for freight  and
insurance  increased at a faster rate than the base guarantee.  However,  if an exchange  rate
guarantee  is  added to the base guarantee,  changes  in the default risk for the importer have no
effect on the value  of the exchange  rate guarantee.  Therefore,  unlike adding coverage  for
freight and  insurance,  adding an exchange  rate guarantee  does not increase  or decrease  the
sensitivity  of the total value  of the guarantee to changes in default risk.
Commodity Value  and Freight
Changing the FOB  value of exports  does not affect the percentage  value of credit
guarantees.  However,  on a per MT basis,  as the FOB value  of exports  increases,  the value
of the guarantee  increases to maintain the same percentage value  (Figure 4).  Thus,
everything else the same  the value of the implicit guarantee  is higher at times  when the FOB
price  is greater.  Similarly,  changing  the cost of freight and insurance  increases  the value  of
a credit guarantee  that covered freight (Figure 5).  Doubling the cost of freight and insurance
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Figure 5.  Value of GSM Guarantee and Components,
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Down Payment.  Principal,  and Interest Covered
The amount of down payment,  principal,  and  interest covered varies  across exporting
counties'  programs.  The model  was  simulated to evaluate the effects of changes  in these
variables on the value of the GSM guarantee.  Increasing  the down payment  as  a percent of
the value  of exports  required  for GSM guarantees  reduces the value  of guarantees  (Figure 6).
Specifically,  in the base case,  the GSM guarantee has no down payment  and has a value of
$21.58/MT.  Increasing  the down payment to  10 percent  reduces the value of the guarantee
to $19.47/MT.  Similarly,  reducing  the percent of the principal covered by a GSM credit
guarantee  by  10 percent has the same  effect (reduced the value of the guarantee to
$19.47/MT)  on the value  of credit guarantees  (Figure  7).  These results illustrate that
changes  in the principal  covered or down payments  required  for credit guarantees  can have
significant  impacts on the value  credit guarantees.
The effect of changes in down payments  and the percent  of principal  covered when
adding an exchange  rate guarantee  and/or freight and  shipping to the base case  reflect a
similar percentage  change  in value with percentage  change in coverage.  This largely  reflects
the limited  impact of adding an exchange  rate  guarantee to the base  case  in this example.  In
cases where the value  of the exchange rate guarantee  is more costly,  increases  in down
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AL  Ak  Ak,.dP~  ak~s  d~~  6~b -~k~  6~-~  8The  U.S. GSM guarantees  the interest accrued at a specified rate, or percentage
points of interest.  This is unlike other exporters who guarantee  a percentage  of the total
interest charged.  The model was  simulated to examine the effect of changing the percentage
points of interest covered by the guarantee.  Changes in the percentage points of interest
covered have limited impact on the value of credit guarantees  (Figure 8).  Increasing  the
percentage  points of interest covered from  .028 to  .06 percent  increases  the value  of
guarantees  by $1.01  per MT.  However,  changing  the term of the guarantee  has more
dramatic results  (Figure 9).  Either lengthening  the term or shortening the term from the
initial  3-year guarantee  reduces the value  of credit guarantees  (basic,  with freight, and with
exchange  rate guarantees).  However,  the value of the exchange rate guarantee  by itself was
highest for short-term guarantees  and decreased as the term increased.
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Figure 8. Value of GSM Guarantee and Components,
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Figure 9.  Value of GSM Guarantee and Components,
By Term of Guarantee
Effects  of Alternative  Lending  Interest Rates on Credit Guarantee  Value
The interest rate charged  for GSM credit guarantees and the spread between the
guarantee  rate and the alternative  cost of money in the importing  country have  interesting
effects  on the value of credit guarantees (Figures  10-11).  Changes in the GSM  interest rate
affects  the value of the basic guarantee,  however changes in the interest rate spread have no
affect on the value of the basic guarantee.  For example,  increasing  the GSM  interest rate
from 6 percent to  7 percent decreases  the value of the basic guarantee from  $23.43/MT to
$21.32/MT  (Figure  10),  while increasing  the importers  interest rate,  which increases  the
interest  rate spread,  has no effect on the value of the base guarantee  (Figure 11).
If an exchange  rate guarantee  is added,  the value of the guarantee  is  affected by
changes  in the interest rate  spread.  For example,  in the base case,  the GSM  interest rate  is
.06875  percent and the alternative  cost of borrowing  in the importing country  is .1305
percent,  resulting  in an interest rate  spread of .06175 percent.  As the GSM interest rate is
increased  to  .1305  percent,  the spread between interest rates declines and the value of the
guarantee  including  an exchange  rate guarantee  increases  (Figure  10).  Beyond  .1305
percent,  the interest  spread becomes  negative  and the value  of the guarantee  with the
exchange  rate  coverage  declines.  Similarly,  as  the importers  alternative cost of borrowing
declines to  .06875  percent,  the spread in interest rates declines  and the value of the exchange
rate guarantee  increases.  Below  .06875 percent,  the spread becomes negative and  the value
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Figure 10.  Value of GSM Guarantee and Components,
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A  Ax  AExchange Rate  Guarantee Parameters
Both the level  and volatility of the exchange  rate have an effect  on the value of the
credit guarantee.  The effect of an exchange  rate  guarantee on the credit guarantee  value  was
evaluated  "at the money."  As the current value  of the exchange  rate  decreases  from the
guaranteed  exchange  rate,  the value of extending a credit guarantee  with exchange rate
coverage  increases  dramatically  (Figure  12).  In this case,  a 20 percent decrease  in the
current value  of the exchange  rate would more than double the value  of the credit guarantee.
Similarly,  increasing the exchange  rate  volatility produces  a similar increase  in the value of
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Comparisons Among  Competing  Countries' Programs
The terms of the export credit programs  vary across  competing exporters and  have an
important effect on their value to importers.  The model was used to determine  the value  of
each of the programs.  This  provides  insight into the relative value to the importer implied  in
each of the exporting countries'  guarantee  programs.  Programs for 4 major exporters  of
wheat were examined  (Canada,  Australia,  France,  and the U.S.).  A base  case  with importer
characteristics  equivalent to those  in the previous  analysis was assumed.  Shipping  costs were
assumed  equal for each exporting country  to provide  a general comparison of the difference
in value  provided by each of the programs.  This focused on true differences  in program
valuation rather than representing differences  in comparative  advantage for shipping costs.
Individual  parameters  for each of the major exporting countries'  programs  are  shown
in Table 4.  and denominated  in local currency.  Parameters represent program provisions  for
each of the programs.  The most  important differences  among the programs are reflected  in
principal  and interest coverage and the percent of down payment required,  however,  the
France/COFACE  program  also covers freight  and insurance.
21
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I  I  I  I  ITable 4.  Initial Parameters  for Comparisons  of Export Credit Programs  for Major Exporters.
Item  U.S.  Canada  France  Australia  Units
Value of exports  for coverage  156.78  184.56  1007.17  118.07  Exp.Cur./MT
Guarantee interest rate  6.875  6.625  6.625  6.625  %
Risk-free  interest rate - Importer  13.05  13.05  13.05  13.05  %
Percent principal coverage  98.0  100.0  95.0  100.0  %
Percent pts.  interest covered  2.8  % pts of interest
Percent of interest coverage  100.0  95.0  75.0  % of interest
Down payment  0.0  25.0  0.0  0.0  %
Current value of
$1000  letter of credit  903.125  1063.0  4976.0  680.0  Exp.  Cur.
Volatility of letter of credit  0.30  0.30  0.30  0.30  Standard Dev.
Current value of exchange  rate  24.58  21.58  4.62  32.02  Imp.Cur./Exp.Cur
Exchange  rate volatility  0.042  0.054  0.094  0.069  Std Dev.
Term  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  Years
The  value of export credit guarantees  was estimated for the programs  offered by
Canada  (Canadian Wheat Board),  Australia,  France-COFACE,  and the U.S.  Results for the
base case  are shown in Table 5.  The  credit guarantee provided by the  Canadian Wheat
Board had the  lowest value ($18.36/MT),  followed by the U.S.  ($21.57/MT),  Australia
($23.23/MT),  and France-COFACE  ($26.32/MT).  The Canadian guarantee  had the lowest
value  primarily because  of the large down payment required  on guaranteed  sales.  The  value
of U.S.  and Australian  guarantees  comprise  a middle ground,  and differences  in values
between the two programs  are largely due  to different coverage  levels  for principal  and
interest.  The French-COFACE  guarantee had the highest value  largely because  the
COFACE guarantee  includes coverage  for freight  and shipping.  Further,  the  COFACE
guarantee  can also include an exchange  rate  guarantee,  adding  further value to the  guarantee
for the  importer.  In this case that value  is an additional  $4.98/MT.
Table 5.  Value  of Export Credit Guarantees  for Major Wheat Exporters.
Country  Basic Guarantee  Exchange  Rate (if offered)
(US$/MT)
United  States  21.57
Canada  (CWB)  18.36
Australia  23.23
France-COFACE*  26.32  4.98
*Includes  coverage  for freight and  shipping.
22Since the volatility of the importer's letter of credit was an assumed value,  the
sensitivity  of valuations  of the export credit programs for the major exporters to changes in
related parameters  was  examined.  These results are shown in Figures  14 & 15.  As the
current value  of the importer's  letter of credit declines  (increase  in potential  default),  the
value  of the export credit programs for each of the major exporters  increases  (Figure  14).
The ranking of values for the export  credit programs  (lowest to highest value)  remains the
same,  but the spread among values for individual exporters'  programs becomes wider.  For
example,  with a current value for the letter of credit of $1000,  the value of Canadian,  U.S.,
Australian,  and  French (COFACE) guarantees was  $14.58,  $17.11,  $18.45,  and $20.90,
respectively.  For more  risky countries,  where  a $1000  letter of credit has depreciated  in
value to $500,  the value  of Canadian,  U.S.,  Australian,  and French (COFACE) values is
$46.54, $55.13  $58.88,  and $66.72,  respectively.  This  represents  a spread of $20.18 per
MT between the Canadian and French programs.  Therefore,  the advantage of the French
(COFACE) guarantee  increases  for riskier importing countries.
Increasing the volatility of the importer's letter of credit,  also implies an increased
potential for default.  Increases  in the volatility results in increased  spreads between the
major exporters'  programs  (Figure  15).  For example,  when the volatility  of the value  for the
importer's  letter of credit is .3, the value of the Canadian,  U.S.,  Australian,  and French
(COFACE) programs  was $18.36,  $21.58,  $23.23,  and $26.32, respectively.  For more
risky countries,  where the value of the importer's letter of credit was more variable
(volatility  =  .5),  values of the Canadian,  U.S.,  Australian,  and French (COFACE) programs
were $33.10,  $39.22,  $41.88,  and $47.45,  respectively.  Thus,  as the probability  of default
increased,  the credit guarantee  provided by France  (COFACE) became  more valuable  in
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CONCLUSIONS  AND  IMPLICATIONS
Use of credit guarantee  programs for the export of agricultural  commodities  escalated
in importance  since the early  1980's.  In this study,  we developed a methodology  to value
export credit guarantees.  This was  applied to  various export  credit guarantee terms and
provisions to  examine the value of providing  increased  flexibility,  and comparisons were
made  with competing  countries'  programs.
The value  of the basic GSM credit guarantee  was most sensitive to the current price
level and  volatility of the importers'  letter of credit (assets  guaranteed).  Adding an exchange
rate guarantee  to the GSM program generally  increased  the value  of the guarantee  minimally
($0.2 per MT).  In addition,  the value of credit guarantees  with an exchange rate  guarantee
were highly sensitive  to the current value,  strike price,  and volatility of exchange rates.  This
indicated that the value  of a credit guarantee  extended to an importer  is largely  a function of
the default probability.
24Adding coverage  for freight and insurance  increased  the value of a credit guarantee by
$3.50 per MT  (16%).  Percentage  changes  in principal,  interest coverage,  term, and down
payment for the GSM  program resulted  in equal or smaller percentage  changes  in the value
of extending  guarantees.  Increasing  the  GSM interest rates  decreased the value of the base
guarantee by  $2.11/MT,  while,  decreases  in the  interest rate spread between the GSM  rate
and the  importers  alternative rate increased  the value of an exchange  rate guarantee.
Therefore,  introducing  flexibility by modification  of terms,  adjusting the percent of coverage,
and  inclusion of freight  and insurance  affect the value of export credit guarantees.  These
effects  are important if the CCC is actively trying to reduce default exposure.  However,
these  values  are evaluated from the perspective  of the CCC.  Valuation  of changes  in these
parameters when viewed by the  administering banks  and importers  may affect the
success/failure  of the implementation  of any of these changes.
Comparisons  of the value  of export credit guarantees  implied  in programs offered by
Canada,  Australia,  France,  and the  U.S.  indicated  differences inherent  in each.  The
Canadian  program had the lowest value;  the French-COFACE  program  had the highest.  The
Canadian program had the lowest value,  primarily  due to the down payment requirement.
The French  (COFACE) program had the highest value because  it covers  freight and
insurance  and it covers more of the  interest.  This relationship holds for a wide range  of
values  for the  price level and volatility of the  importers'  letter of credit.  Further,  the  spread
between valuations  of individual exporters'  programs became  wider as the potential  for
default increased,  giving  a greater value  to the  French/COFACE  program.
With premiums  for credit  guarantees  at  .15  to  .67  percent of the value of exports  for
U.S.  guarantees  (Table  1),  the  "fair market  value"  of export credit  guarantees  is larger than
income received  from premiums.  Therefore,  governments  are not charging an actuarially
fair rate  for credit guarantees  and in fact an implicit subsidy would be embedded  in exports
in this  case.  This  is not surprising.  In fact,  Funatsu,  who examined  extending  insurance
guarantees  for Eximbank loans,  indicated  that underpricing  or charging  very low premiums
for insurance  coverage  may  be optimal behavior if the objective  is to maximize  exports.
Hyberg,  et al.  estimated  the  implicit interest subsidy  in GSM  guarantees  for wheat to
all  countries at 4 percent.  To be comparable,  our estimate  of the  "fair market value"  of the
guarantee  would have  to be reduced  by the amount of premiums paid and aggregated  across
countries.  Dahl,  et al.  measured  implicit interest subsidies  for selected countries  ranged
from  .89 percent to  12.43  percent of the value  of imports.  Our estimate for the base case is
on the high side of this range  (13.76%  -.67%  =  13.09%),  yet is highly  sensitive to critical
variables  that were unobtainable  (volatility  of the letter of credit).
25These results  are highly dependent  on the initial parameters  specified.  This focuses
attention on one of the major problems associated  with option valuation of guarantees.  An
important problem is in obtaining the current value  of the  assets being  guaranteed.  Since
daily observations for the current  value of letters  of credit are not readily  observable,  this
methodology may be more appropriate for use as a ranking tool or as a decision aid when
determining  where to allocate  a given amount of guarantees  over a cross section of
countries/banks.  Further empirical  research is also required to determine distributions  for
the current value of assets.
In retrospect,  values for letters of credit and exchange  rates may be correlated.
Therefore,  holding one of these constant while moving the  other in a sensitivity analysis
framework  may not be representative.  Further,  the degree  of interaction  of items affecting
both the  valuation of the basic  guarantee and the exchange  rate guarantee  is unknown.
Trigeorgis presented  a potential methodology  that considers  the interaction  of terms in
multiple options,  but this was beyond the scope  of this study.  Finally,  further  research  is
also required on the valuation of changes in program  provisions from the perspective  of
participating  banks and importers.
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